IN BRIEF:
Pakistan's blasphemy crisis exposes a deeper
tension between Islamic jurisprudence and the modern nation-state. Although
state executions for apostasy or blasphemy are relatively rare, mob killings
persist, particularly in Pakistan, demonstrating that religious punishment may
be enforced by communities even when state authorities refrain from carrying it
out.
The essay argues that this violence reflects more than failures of law enforcement. It arises from the interaction of traditional Islamic doctrines—enjoining right and forbidding wrong and individual obligation—with an honour-and-shame social framework that can encourage believers to punish perceived religious offences themselves.
The central paradox is that Muslim-majority states may resort to authoritarian rule to maintain civil order, yet struggle to reconcile their obligations to international norms and legal institutions with religious demands for the enforcement of sharia. Where state authority competes with religious authority, or fails to restrain vigilantism, coercive government and mob violence can coexist. The essay argues that this tension raises fundamental questions about the compatibility of traditional sharia-based obligations with the pluralism, rule of law, and institutional accountability required of the modern nation-state.
THE HUMANISTS had a meeting recently where blasphemy laws were discussed with a focus on Pakistan. A notable comment was that Pakistan has not executed anyone for blasphemy for some time, despite it being the sharia-defined punishment in Islam. However, mobs have killed people based just on allegations of blasphemy. This raises important issues that link or separate Islam from the nation state it occupies and clarifies the understanding of the relationship between Islam as an independent dominant modus vivendi, and the nation-state which is essential to a global world order.
IN TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, blasphemy performed by a Muslim is apostasy and is considered a capital offence punishable by death.[1] Notwithstanding contextually misquoted verses such as “To you be your religion, and to me my religion”[2], “There is no compulsion in religion”[3] and “Then whosoever wills, let him believe; and whosoever wills, let him disbelieve.”[4], the punishment is a dire afterlife of hell for those who commit apostasy. Indeed, Muslims are required to punish them on behalf of Allah, such as “…slay the idolators wherever ye find them…”[5] and “Fight against them [the unbelievers] so that Allah will punish them by your hands”[6] abrogating more tolerant verses and Westerners’ fallacious opinions of Islam as a religion of peace.
While ten to twelve countries legally authorize the death penalty for apostasy[7], executions are rare. Iran as one of the top three executioner states uses apostasy- or heresy-adjacent charges (such as "enmity against God" or "corruption on earth") as much a means of control by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as quelling apostasy, which often gains just long prison sentences.[8]
STATE EXECUTIONS FOR BLASPHEMY ARE LOW, yet many people are killed for it, most frequently in northern Nigeria, Bangladesh and principally Pakistan, which sees more mob killings related to blasphemy allegations than any country in the world.[9] This in part antagonism to non-Muslims, even though some Islamic schools state that sharia punishment applies only to Muslims.[10] So what drives the Muslim mob to kill and states to withhold the same punishment? Indeed, Pakistan’s state agencies stand accused of gross defects of justice and public protection, showing implicit support for mob actions.[11]
ISLAM’S FOUNDATIONS AND ETHICS arise from the honour and shame culture-based communities of 7th century Saudi Arabia, which had a heightened concern for both personal and group reputation, plus a high sensitivity to insults, sleights and challenges to one’s reputation which could lead to shame. There is a strong conviction that people should handle their own management of honour, standing up for themselves when challenged and not turn to third parties to resolve conflicts. They tend to place higher value on virtues and character traits like courage, hospitality, loyalty, integrity, group solidarity, and collective identity and responsibility. They tend to be tribal, identifying with individuals they know and interact with daily.[12] With laws set in place at that time and for eternity by Allah, Islam shapes the Muslim world of today.
MUSLIMS ARE COMMANDED to enjoin right and forbid wrong (لْأَمْرُ بِٱلْمَعْرُوفِ وَٱلنَّهْيُ عَنِ ٱلْمُنْكَرِ)[13]. The Koran is explicit in this requirement[14] as a means of enforcement of sharia and upholding community morals. The term for the doctrine is hisbah, (لحسبة) the individual or collective duty (depending on the Islamic school of law) to intervene and enforce Islamic law. It forms a central part of the Islamic doctrine for Muslims. Directly couple with this is the doctrine of farḍ al-'ayn (فرض العين), individual responsibility. Under fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), fard[15] is obligatory. This means that the responsibility to forbid wrong falls on the individual as a matter of commitment, and this is what we see when a mob of Muslims hounds a victim to death for apostasy or other haram or forbidden solecism. Not all Muslims will act in this way of course. Just the good ones. It’s what I’ve termed retributive subsidiarity, where acts of punishment are carried out at the lowest or most local level of ability. Is the state ceding judicial responsibility to the mob?
A STATE’S ROLE IN THE WORLD has to be seen as responsible to other states so that diplomatic and trade negotiations can take place in good faith. States are concerned about such perceptions and how they rank. It’s not good to have a sullied reputation for human rights when they can affect deals and treaties. All too often, however, states’ leadership’s internal and international behaviour conflicts with Islam’s obligations. The state has the power and resources to maintain control, while Islam has the laws, responsibility, and obligation to rule the people. This is a paradox that neither Islam nor nation-states can resolve without extreme measures. States such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia manage it by proscribing extremist groups as they do with the Muslim Brotherhood, and by exercising strict, even tyrannical rules to maintain a semblance of order. On the other hand, Muslim extremists spread their fundamentalist message through mosques, a collective understanding of Islamic obligations, and the power of the ummah, the international brotherhood of Muslims. Therein lies the base-course of Islam.
ISLAM’S RULES ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MODERN WORLD. For true Muslims there is only one course, sharia law, and nothing must impede its application. To do so will bring strife until the world’s population submits to the will of Allah and his laws.[16]
[1] Durie, Mark - Sleepwalking into Sharia quoted in On Blasphemy: Immigrant Muslim Leaders in America by Angela D. Ewing, Walden University 2019, paper on request. Also here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yG2l4e8zta4
[2] Koran 109:6
[3] Koran 2:256
[4] Koran 18:29
[5] Koran 9:5
[6] Koran 9:14
[7] https://humanists.international/get-involved/resources/the-right-to-apostasy-in-the-world/
[8] https://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2021/11/death-sentence-for-apostasy-in-nearly-a-dozen-countries-report-says
[9] https://religiousfreedominstitute.org/nigeria-is-following-pakistan-on-blasphemy-and-mob-violence/
[11] https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/06/09/conspiracy-grab-land/exploiting-pakistans-blasphemy-laws-blackmail-and-profit
[12] Tamler Sommers, Sam Harris’ Waking Up podcast #128 In Defense of Honor, 18’. https://www.samharris.org/podcasts/making-sense-episodes/126-defense-honor
[13] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enjoining_good_and_forbidding_wrong
[15] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fard
[16] The books of Sayyid Qutb - Milestones, In the Shade of the Qur’an, Social Justice in Islam, and The America I Have Seen; and of Hasan al-Banna - Collection of Letters. Hisba in Europe by Lorenzo Vidino, publisher The European Foundation for Democracy, June 2013.
No comments:
Post a Comment